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Over the past decade significant attention has been given to the study of
constitutional shortcomings and failures. Scholars such as Mark Brandon1 and Mark
Graber2 have extensively studied the degree to which the United States Constitution has
failed to provide an operative political system and the impact of constitutional failure on
American political development. Much of this scholarship has concentrated on the
nineteenth century, particularly the period leading up to and immediately following the
Civil War, but more recently, scholars have begun to examine contemporary
constitutional failure. Sandford Levinson’s recent book, Our Undemocratic Constitution,
demonstrates the degree to which the United States Constitution fails to constitute a truly
democratic political order and, thereby, fails to realize many of our most important
political and social values. The point of Levinson's work is to get Americans to consider
constitutional reform.3 However, Levinson readily acknowledges that Americans
venerate their Constitution. The degree to which Americans are socialized to revere the
Constitution creates a significant obstacle to constitutional reform insofar as reform
requires Americans to admit that the venerable Constitution is fundamentally flawed.
Past constitutional reformers have found the American civic religion too great a cultural
barrier—and the strictures of Article V too great a burden—to achieve even minor
constitutional reform.
Given that amendment is unlikely, it is worth considering what options are
available to (1) enhance democratic practice and (2) protect liberties jeopardized by the
partial realization of the unitary executive following September 11th, 2001. While early
American constitutionalism is the source of many constitutional woes, it also provides
resources for achieving the aspirations of constitutional reformers. In my schmooze
ticket, I argue that the abandoned tradition of state interposition as found in the political
theory of John Taylor of Carolene and the practice of New England states during the
embargo crisis of 1808-9 affords a constitutional resource that can enhance majoritarian
democratic practice and provide greater civil libertarian protection from executive
authority.
The theory and practice of state interposition are widely associated with the
doctrine of nullification; an association that undoubtedly arose from Calhoun’s reliance
on interposition theory to justify concurrent majorities. However, while interposition
may be necessary for nullification, nullification is not necessary to interposition. As will
be illustrated below, state interposition was closely linked with national popular
majorities and a check on executive power. Interposition arose out of the advent of
“party spirit” in government, which reduced the efficacy of ambition counteracting
ambition among the various departments of government. Alterations to the distribution
of power in the political system were more easily accommodated when partisan loyalty
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trumped institutional prerogative. Early constitutional thinkers and political officials
moved to counteract this development by distributing the interpretive enterprise more
widely.
In many ways, the United States lost certain traditions that expanded the
enterprise of constitutional interpretation. In the early American Republic, states were a
vibrant source of constitutional innovation. Unfortunately, much of that tradition came to
be associated with Southern illiberalism and the maintenance of ascriptive hierarchy.
However, this was not always the case. During the Jefferson Administration,
northeastern states asserted their authority to interpret the Constitution as a means of
critiquing abusive executive power. State driven constitutionalism provided an important
source of executive power on constitutional grounds, criticism largely absent today, and
resulted in important constraints on power and policy changes.
This paper proceeds first by briefly explaining the political theory of John Taylor
of Carolene. Taylor was the father of American interposition but is generally considered
outside the traditional canon of great antebellum American political thinkers. Taylor’s
theories address many of the constitutional concerns later raised by contemporary
scholars. Second, I provide a brief account of the embargo crisis that occurred at the end
of Jefferson’s presidency. Most importantly, states in the northeastern portion of the
country responded aggressively to Jefferson’s rapid accumulation of constitutionally
suspect powers. State level responses helped limit Jeffersonian authority and mobilize
the people against policies deemed illegitimate and constitutionally suspect. Finally, I
conclude by making some (very) tentative conclusions and suggestions regarding the
benefits of a constitutionalism inclusive of interposition given the relative similarities of
contemporary events and the events of the early nineteenth century. Essentially, I
describe a “thin” version of interposition tied to constitutional politics and national
majorities that could help abate the trend of executive aggrandizement or, at least, ensure
greater consensus prior to the full realization of those policies.
ROOTS OF INTERPOSITION
Interposition is best known as the predecessor of Calhoun’s vision of concurrent
majorities and nullification. Calhoun’s theories have been widely discredited and,
largely, abandoned as meritless and dangerous. However, early incarnations, both
theoretical and practical, of interposition are surprisingly tempered and majoritarian when
compared to Calhoun’s doctrine. In part this was due to very different motivations. John
Taylor of Carolene desired to protect majorities locally from minorities who seized power
in the nascent national government. Taylor, like many of the Framing generation,
expressed grave concerns over whether the institutions promulgated in Philadelphia
would truly protect the general welfare.4 Specifically, Taylor feared that a factious
4
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minority would gain control over the national government to the detriment of the
people’s liberty.
Whereas Madison believed that any ruling cabal could be factious, Taylor argued
majorities could never be factious as the majority were the people. The key to legitimacy
in the new government was to ensure that the majority would always guide national
policy-making. However, Taylor lacked faith in the newly constituted selection methods.
Should national elections fail to achieve a government representative of the people,
factious government could assert inappropriate prerogative over national policy-making.
Of gravest concern, factious parties could render interpretations of the Constitution
inconsistent with the general will and trammel the authority of resisting political
institutions.
To protect the majority from factious oppression, Taylor theorized a role for state
governments in constitutional politics that would afford the people greater civil
libertarian protection. First, if/when the national government or a department of
government illegitimately trammeled the liberties of the people, the state could interpose
itself between the tyrannical national government and its citizens. Second, states would
serve as a catalyst for action and conduit through which the people could form organized
resistance. Despite calling on states for an important role in constitutional politics,
Taylor believed that state interposition would occur rarely5 and only in constitutional
controversies. When the mechanisms of selecting national officeholders worked
properly, the national government would legislate consistent with the general welfare.
However, when selection mechanisms failed to produce a regime in step with the polity
and the regime attempted to instill a new constitutional order that encroached on the
liberties of the people, states should act to interpose themselves to prevent harm befalling
their citizens. Normal politics should take its due course but structural changes to the
distribution of power in the national government could require state action on behalf of
its citizenry. Thus, as Taylor declared, when factious regimes exercised contested
constitutional authority, a state would contest the power but the “[o]pposition must…be
constitutional.”6
To Taylor, the fact that the national government was given certain powers once
held by the states, state governments retained the responsibility for protecting the liberty
of their citizens. In large part, this responsibility flowed from a continuous responsibility
to interpret the Constitution, which Taylor believed was a concurrent power shared by all
political actors and institutions. However, Taylor was especially concerned with the loss
of liberty to a factious and interested national government. Taylor claimed that “the force
of self-love is as strong in majorities as in an individual, but its effect is precisely
contrary. It excites one man to do wrong because he is surrounded with objects of
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oppression, and majorities to do right because he can find none.”7 As Taylor saw it,
factious coalitions could easily thwart the liberties of the people given the rise of partisan
spirit. Whereas Madison vested his civil libertarian protection in jealous and competitive
separate departments of government, Taylor postulated that these departments, unified by
partisanship, could work in concert with each other to the detriment of the people.
Another layer of protection was needed and Taylor believed state governments should
play that role. When a factious national government attempted to alter the constitutional
order, states intervened by declaring what one scholar of Taylor described as
“declarations of disagreement.”8
Importantly, the point of these declarations was not to nullify the policy in
question. Rather, public declarations of disagreement made states the focal point of
political resistance to national policies. By refusing to capitulate to the constitutional
innovation at issue, state governments attempted placed itself between the oppressor and
the citizen. Of course, the tactics of resistance and delay likely had greater efficacy when
the federal government lacked the bureaucracy it created in the twentieth century.
However, Taylor was not just concerned about limiting the reach of the suspect federal
policy, he also desired a source of mobilization against the illegitimate constitutionalism
emanating from the national government. Typical of classical republican thought,
Taylor had little faith that the people alone can resist federal encroachment. Action by
the people themselves often looked like mobbish and lawless. First, the people lacked the
necessary organization for proper (and peaceful) resistance. Second, a popular
movement was susceptible to executive persuasion. Taylor argued the executive branch
had special access to information that could be used to create public support for their
positions. Of particular concern to Taylor, the president, as head of foreign and military
matters, could claim unique knowledge, impossible to rebut, that would deflate resistance
by the people.9 Since the people alone are not an appropriate source for constitutional
resistance, states must interpose to maintain the constitutional status quo.
Of course, state resistance to national constitutional re-interpretation begs the
question: To what end? Taylor acknowledged federal supremacy, rejected nullification,
and dreaded civil war so what did state interposition accomplish? Taylor indicates two
objects that can be achieved through interposition. First, state resistance creates a form of
gridlock that slows the spread of the constitutional evil. Second, through the declaration
of disagreement, the resisting state provides a constitutional alternative to the one
promulgated by the national government. Taylor believed that there was a natural
affinity between the people and their state governments that could trump the persuasive
force of the executive. Whereas the people could not mobilize for themselves, the people
could be trusted as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional controversies provided they had a
choice. With states protecting against national oppression, the people would have the
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time necessary to express their preference through the ballot10 or through the
constitutional amendment process.11 Taylor’s faith in elections as the appropriate
mechanism for resolving constitutional conflicts echoes his belief that state interposition
was essentially majoritarian in nature.
INTERPOSITION AND EXECUTIVE POWER
As noted above, Taylor expressed particular concern over aggrandizement of
power in the executive. More than any other institution, Taylor believed that the Framers
erred instilling the president with authority too great for one individual to wield. In his
words, “The presidency, gilded with kingly powers, has been tossed into the constitution,
against the publick [sic] sentiment, and gravely bound in didatick [sic] fetters, like those
which in England and France have become political old junk.”12 The problems of a
single executive were aggravated by the rise of party spirit, which helped loyalty to the
administration trump both institutional prerogative and public virtue. Factious
government led to unconstitutional government.
While Taylor expressed concern over many facets of executive power, no where
was the problem more acute than in the executive’s war powers. With the ability of the
president to use the party system, Taylor worried that a small number of party members
could arrive at a decision that would plunge the nation into war. Dividing the war powers
between Congress and the presidency did little to prevent inappropriate military action if
members of Congress were more loyalty to the president than their own institution.
According to Taylor, war motivated by factious interest would violate the principles upon
which the Constitution was founded. He seemed particularly concerned that war could be
used to “wag the dog” even when the object and action were unpopular among the
masses. War would always be profitable among certain elites and loyal citizens tended,
at least in the short run to rally around the administration.13 Thus, executive war powers,
“unsubjected to public opinion,” could be used to advance presidential ambitions and
prop up vulnerable office holders.
However, if properly enabled, the people could see through such misdirection.
Taylor argued that “‘[w]ar, to rally the people round the government’ was…but a shallow
device.”14 States could expose how executive policy harmed the liberties of the people
and provide the leadership and resistance necessary for the people time to express their
opposition. Expression would come through the democratic process. A sufficient
number of elections would result in either successful removal of the factious government
from office or, in the case of poorly functioning methods of selection, constitutional
10
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amendment that would remedy the institutional evil resulting in factious government.
Either way, state interposition would provide some measure of protection of liberty while
the popular groundswell was building.
The current state of politics leads one to believe that many of Taylor’s concerns
have come home to roost. Executive ambitions have led to sweeping exercise of the war
powers. The president’s position in the party enabled the Administration to overcome
congressional resistance to policies that reduce civil libertarian protections. True to
Taylor’s visions, the American people rallied around the Administration during wartime
despite seeming trepidation about the leadership’s judgment. Yet, despite pockets of
resistance to Administration policies, state governments have been notable for their
silence on the new constitutional order and the harm befallen civil libertarian protections.
Today, we do not expect states to act as a Taylorian countervailing force. But such was
not always the case. Taylor’s theory was put to action, not in Calhoun’s South, but in
Webster’s New England. During the Jefferson Administration, northern states responded
to the national embargo by refusing to fully enforce the embargo and publicly declared
their belief that several embargo measures (the fourth Embargo Act in particular) were
unconstitutional. The effect was to limit the impact of Jefferson’s policies and to
institutionalize resistance to policies of contested constitutional legitimacy.
THE EMBARGO AND INTERPOSITION
By 1807, war between England and France began to take a major toll on the
United States. Squeezed between Napoleon’s Continental System and England’s orders
in council, US merchant vessels were regularly boarded, their freight seized, and their
sailors impressed into foreign service. Such events came to a head when the British navy
attacked the American merchant frigate Chesapeake. Less than two weeks later,
President Thomas Jefferson described the events thusly:
And at length a deed, transcending all we have suffered, brings the public
sensibility to a serious crisis, and forbearance to a necessary pause. A
frigate of the US trusting to a state of peace and leaving her harbor on a
distant service, has been surprised and attacked by a British vessel of
superior force, one of a squadron then lying in our waters to cover the
transaction, & has been disabled from service with the loss of a number of
men killed & wounded. This enormity was not only without provocation
or justifiable cause; but was committed with the avowed purpose of taking
by force from a ship of war of the US a part of her crew: and that no
circumstance might be wanting to make its character, the commander was
apprised that the seamen thus forcibly … were native citizens of the US.15
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Public outcry demanded action and, in the North, the action demanded was war.
However, Jefferson steered a course intended to keep the US out of war but, in so doing,
he would exercise unprecedented powers as the commander in chief and use the military
for domestic law enforcement.
Jefferson realized that direct confrontation with either France or England would
lead to US defeat. The US was not in a position to take on either the British navy or
French land forces so Jefferson advocated economic warfare that would bring great
pressure to bear on both countries, particularly England. Economic embargo promised,
Jefferson believed, to be a new form of warfare that would swiftly demoralize the English
and alter their willful antagonizing of American merchant ships. However, a successful
embargo would mean eliminating all forms of international trade, which, in turn, would
cause significant financial harm to the nation as a whole and disproportionate harm to the
merchant class of the northeast.16 Creating international economic turmoil would require
near-total compliance with the embargo and, to achieve this end, Jefferson demanded
enforcement authority that bent the Constitution to his will.
Within four months of the embargo, Congress passed three enforcement laws at
the president’s request. In each case, the measures were passed with extraordinary
rapidity due to “the operation of the Democratic-Republican machine”17 even to the point
where the Senate suspended their requirement to read a bill on three consecutive days to
pass the first embargo bill in a matter of hours. Numerous (Federalist) legislators
complained about the lack of information coming from the Administration, which
hampered congressional deliberations. Rep. Barent Gardenier (NY) claimed, “Darkness
and mystery overshadow this House and the whole nation. We know nothing, we are
permitted to know nothing. We sit here as mere automata; we legislate without knowing,
nay, sir, without wishing to know, why or wherefore. We are told what we are to do,
and…do it.” Officeholders from the northeast also complained of the embargo’s suspect
constitutionality. Speaking from the floor of the House, Josiah Quincy (MA) noted the
lack of express constitutional authorization for the embargo and asserted, “It was
impossible that the Framers should presume that a power would be exercised which
would exceed any exercised by the most despotic Governments in the world.”18 Each
embargo act contained provisions that arguably pushed the constitutional envelope,
particularly as it pertained to executive authority19 but it was the fourth act that ran so far
afoul of the Constitution as to push New England states to interposition.
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The fourth embargo act, authored by Jefferson and Secretary of the Treasury
Albert Gallatin,20 contained two provisions of dubious constitutionality. Section six of
the fourth embargo act declared
“no ship or vessel having any cargo whatever on board, shall…be allowed
to depart from any port of the US, for any other port or district of the
United States, adjacent to the territories, colonies, or provinces of a
foreign nation…without special permission of the President of the United
States.”21
This had the dual effect of crippling commerce along the Canadian border and
consolidating executive control over commercial activity throughout the northeast. Time
and again, New Englanders asserted a right to engage in commercial activity and deemed
the blanket prohibition unconstitutional. Contemporary scholars may take for granted the
idea that Congress can prohibit certain (foreign) commerce, yet, as of 1808, “the power to
regulate commerce had never been considered as an authority to prohibit it altogether.”22
Moreover, the provision that required merchant ships to receive “special permission”
from Jefferson consolidated power in the executive to a degree that, Federalists argued,
violated the allocation of powers within the constitutional system.
The enforcement mechanism in the fourth embargo act also raised serious
constitutional concerns. Section seven permitted
the public armed vessels and gun boats of the United States shall, as well
as the commanders or masters of the revenue cutters, and revenue boats,
be authorized, and they are hereby authorized to stop and examine any
vessel, flat, or boat, belonging to any citizen of the United States, either on
the high seas, or within the jurisdiction of the United States, or any foreign
vessel within the jurisdiction of the United States, which there may be
reason to suspect to be engaged in any traffic or commerce, or the
transportation of merchandise…contrary to the provisions of this act.
For the first time, the United States armed forces would be used for the purposes of
domestic law enforcement against its own citizens. In essence, Jefferson turned his
commander-in-chief powers inward in way unanticipated in the absence of insurrection.23
Yet, the matter was never seriously discussed in Congress nor did Jefferson explain his
rationale for requesting the power.
A secondary problem arose out of the authorization to search vessels upon mere
suspicion. One contemporary Jeffersonian critic argues that the provision conflicted with
20
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the language of the Fourth Amendment as it eliminated a need for either probable cause
or a warrant.24 However, public objections to the embargo never cited the Fourth
Amendment even as they complained about the tyrannical nature of the provision.25
Rather, complaints centered on how the provision aggrandized power in the executive
and how it trampled upon the commercial liberties of the American people. A northern
reading of the Constitution made commercialism central to constitutional protection and,
as a consequence, Jeffersonian policies violated the Constitution.26 Such an
understanding of the Constitution could not stand and northeastern lawmakers soon
threatened action to protect against further intrusion. As Josiah Quincy declared,
“…whether in the Constitution itself the power of laying an embargo be given. If such a
power exists, then it is idle to say that this is the last time it will be exercised; the
commercial States will not rest until they shall bring forward amendments by which the
power will be limited.” Federalists in the House and Senate did not enjoy sufficient
numbers to counter Jefferson’s authority. However, the so-called commercial states
moved quickly toward interposition.
Consistent with Taylorism, several New England states declared their
disagreement over the constitutionality of the embargo and subsequent force acts. Yet,
also consistent with Taylor’s theory, these objections were pro-union and constitutional
in nature. Harrison Gray Otis, a member of the famed Essex Junto and Massachusetts
state legislator, suggested a conference “for the purpose of providing some mode of relief
that may not be inconsistent with the union of these states.”27 Rather than a special
convention, the Massachusetts House of Representatives moved against Jefferson by
passing a report that condemned the fourth embargo act and declared it “in many respects
unjust, oppressive and unconstitutional, and not legally binding on the citizens of this
State.”
The Connecticut General Assembly followed suit by passing a similar, if more
stringent in tone, resolution. The Assembly noted that when facing a measure of dubious
constitutionality it is
the duty of the legislative and executive authority in the State, to withhold
their aid, and co-operation, from the execution of the act…While it is the
duty of the Legislature to guard the sovereignty of the State, and your
rights from encroachment, it continues to be your interest and duty, as
peaceable citizens, to abstain from all resistance, against acts, which
24
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purport to be laws of the United States. Be advised to seek none but
constitutional relief.
Later the same month, the General Assembly passed a special resolution that reiterated
the unconstitutionality of the embargo force acts and instructed “persons holding
executive offices under this State, are restrained by the duties which they owe this State,
from affording any official aid or cooperation in the execution of the act aforesaid.” The
measure applied equally to the state militia, which posed a problem for Jefferson’s plan
to call forth the militia to supplement the regular army that was already enforcing the
embargo.28
The direct effects of the Massachusetts and Connecticut resolutions are unclear
but, in both states and throughout the northeast, election results indicate that voters from
New York to Maine largely approved of the continuing resistance effort. Federalists
picked up 24 seats in the House almost all of which came from states in the northeastern
part of the country.
The combination of state opposition, and continued popular resistance to the
embargo proved fatal to the policy. Seeing both the state declarations and the election
results, Jeffersonian Republicans in the House and Senate eagerly supported a less
abrasive alternative. Jefferson was equally humbled. In February of 1809, Congress
substituted non-intercourse for embargo. Non-intercourse was so innocuous that it posed
no obstacle to foreign trade and international commerce quickly resumed to its preembargo levels. The anti-embargo response that began at the state level and, then,
evolved into national policy “impos[ed] upon Jefferson the deepest humiliation of his
career.”29
As a matter of policy, the embargo’s end was a clear victory for the Federalists.
As a matter of constitutional construction, the Federalists successfully ended a policy
they viewed as tyrannical. However, the idea that the national government lacks the
power to destroy foreign commerce never receives authoritative construction. In fact, the
Supreme Court’s commerce clause jurisprudence decades later concretizes Jefferson’s
take on national dominion over foreign and interstate commerce. Of course, this was
John Taylor’s point. State interposition did not result in constitutional consensus, rather,
it provided the time to create consensus on a contested constitutional power while
minimizing the harm to civil liberties.
NINETEENTH CENTURY LESSONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
There are obvious parallels between events of the early nineteenth century and
today. Jefferson sought and received significant new powers in the name of fighting a
new war. Rather than thoughtful discussion regarding the new powers and their relation
to existing allocation of powers, party spirit motivated Congress to approve
28
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unprecedented and constitutionally questionable powers to the executive branch.
Jefferson also turned the war powers inward not to quell insurrection or rebellion but to
enforce the new war. Despite significant congressional majorities, there were reasons to
doubt the majoritarian nature of these policies. The Constitution clearly allotted
legislative representation not necessarily reflective of majoritiarianism and, in the case of
embargo, the country’s (free) population centers were predominantly in areas of the
country that opposed embargo.30
Today, the Bush Administration claimed (and received) significant new authority
to fight the war on terror. Congress’s superficial debates have turned more on party spirit
than substantive constitutional discourse. The resulting policies have utilized executive
power to combat the war on terror in ways that directly trammel the liberties of US
citizens. These policies have been promulgated by an Administration that came to power
absent a national majority and bolstered by an undemocratic senate and malapportioned
House. This is not to say that the American people haven’t responded positively to
certain anti-terror policies. However, the people have been offered few alternatives to
current policy. The lack of options reflects a major difference between early nineteenth
century resistance and events nearly two centuries later.
Taylor warned that the people themselves were not a viable source for resistance
to the persuasive effect of the national executive. The unique position of the president in
public life as head of state and head of the executive would have great persuasive effect
on the people. The people alone could not be expected to see through executive
deception. Taylor likely overstates the ineptitude of the people.31 However, dissent
undoubtedly gains traction when powerful political actors and institutions take resonant
positions. Or conversely, dissent concretizes when respected officials articulate
alternative positions. Today, the Administration’s near interpretive hegemony32 is
notable given the absence of this dominance in early nineteenth century politics.
What I mean to suggest is the absence of a once robust constitutional tradition.
States have played an inconsequential role in constitutional interpretation in the postSeptember 11th world even as the national government has moved against liberties state
constitutions explicitly protect. Most recently, Section 7 of the Military Commission Act
of 2006 prohibited courts from hearing “an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed
by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
30
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determination.” Every state constitution (and that of Washington DC) contains a
prohibition against suspending the write of habeas corpus “except in cases of rebellion or
invasion” and none of them qualify this in relation to citizenship. Six states contain
absolute prohibitions on suspension of the Great Writ.33 Contemporary politics does not
requires states to defend rights and privileges only in the shadows of constitutional
provisions but those boldly articulated in both state and national constitutions. For those
seeking a voice of resistance, states can provide such a voice if they recover interposition.
I do not mean to suggest state interposition for the sake of creating a political
quagmire. Our system is sufficiently inefficient that we do not need to create greater
opposition to change absent a fundamental challenge to the principles of constitutional
democracy. Specifically, when there is (1) a change to the constitutional order to the
detriment of civil liberties and (2) that runs counter to majoritarian references,
interposition could ensure vigorous debate and a legitimate constitutional order. In this
way, interposition would be quite thin in that its usage would be limited to extreme cases.
However, in those cases, its value is inestimable.
Thin interposition is certainly relevant to contemporary politics. I do not believe I
need to spill much ink on the changes to the constitutional order that have harmed civil
liberties. Needless to say, constitutional innovations such as warrantless domestic
eavesdropping, indefinite detention of alleged terrorists, and the suspension of habeas
corpus for those deemed unlawful enemy combatants reduced civil libertarian
protections. In addition, Administration policies have not enjoyed clear majoritarian
support. In the case of the war on terror, despite the general support the Administration
enjoys for its anti-terror policies (outside of the war in Iraq), specific, invasive policies do
not enjoy nearly the same levels of support. A recent CBS News/New York Times poll
indicated that Americans were split on whether “people suspected of involvement in
terrorist attacks against the United States” should be tried by civilian or military
commissions. An overwhelming majority (63%) favored following international
agreements when it came to the treatment of “prisoners of war.”34 The same poll
indicated that fifty-seven percent of Americans believed the CIA should “abide by the
same Geneva Convention standards that apply to the U.S. military” and should not “be
able to use more forceful interrogation techniques than the Geneva Convention.” Polling
numbers are not definitive here, but they indicate healthy dissent to Bush Administration
policies that turn on American constitutionalism. Yet, unlike in Jeffersonian America,
there has been no significant constitutional response from state institutions.
Beyond serving as a source for resistance, interposition shares two benefits with
modern theories of departmentalism. First, a thin version of interposition spurs
constitutional deliberation. Conflict over constitutional meaning will require the
33

Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas do not provide exceptions to the
protection of habeas corpus. Louisiana and North Carolina provide that the writ “shall not be suspended”
and Missouri, Montana, and Texas provided the writ “shall never be suspended.” Oklahoma’s Constitution
states that the writ “shall never be suspended by the authorities of the state.”
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Polling numbers are available on line at http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm. (Visited on November
3, 2006)
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competing institutions to vie for the hearts and minds of the polity. Campaigns to win
popular support will require public discourse. I do not portend that the discourse will
amount to the Hayne-Webster debate but forcing institutions to justify and explain
constitutional innovations that harm civil liberties will, at a minimum, create pressures to
develop sound reasons for the policy in question. This leads to the second benefit:
consensus on constitutional policy. Deadlock over constitutional policy will be resolved
but only after one side builds sufficient support either on the merits or through electoral
victories. Much as the New England states were able to win anti-embargo support so to
will future parties, institutions, and governments win support for their constitutional
vision.35 Interposition is not a guarantee of a strong civil libertarian regime but it is a
democratic vision.
Finally, interposition provides a benefit quite distinct from theories of
departmentalism. Departmentalism is largely concerned with co-equal interpretation at
the national level but unified party control over the national government renders suspect
departmentalism as a check on abusive authority. While interposition does not occur
wholly outside of the American party system, it provides an opportunity for a party out of
power at the national level to interject (potentially majoritarian) objections to the party in
power’s policy. Moreover, (as I have realized with my recent westward move) party
ideology at the state level diverges widely from its parent national ideology.36 This is far
from a guarantee that states will act in opposition to the national government but it
changes the incentive structure for action by reducing the effects of homogenous party
ideology.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
I mentioned above that interposition is worth considering because of the
unlikelihood of calling a constitutional convention with an eye toward reforming some of
our constitutional stupidities. I do not fool myself by thinking that interposition has
significantly higher probabilities of realization. However, interposition illustrates that
vigorous practices existed in early American constitutionalism that speak to
contemporary problems. Such practices were theorized to compensate for many of the
constitutional deficiencies we now debate. Modern scholars and activists who wish to
find ways to resist aspects of the twenty-first American Constitution will benefit from
considering the merits of bygone constitutional traditions that helped advance democratic
practice while resisting changes to the constitutional order.
Unfortunately for interposition, advocates for nullification used interposition
theory to justify concurrent majorities. Yet, this development was contingent upon a
35

In this way, breaking the constitutional deadlock will resemble Ackerman’s theory of constitutional
amendment outside of Article V, if without the constitutional moment. A series of electoral victories for
the coalition endorsing the suspect constitutional innovation will signal popular support for it. A series of
electoral defeats will signal popular rejection.
36
Strands of libertarianism, found in both major parties in the non-coastal West, afford both the opportunity
and motivation for constitutional dissent.
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system bent on maintaining a constitutional evil. While many of the institutions that
accommodated slavery still exist, the twenty-first century Constitution does not face the
same pressures that led to nullification. A thin version of interposition seems viable in
modern politics. In fact, historical analysis of American political history may reveal a
recurrent tradition akin to interposition. The Southern Manifesto, written in response to
Brown v. Board of Education, appears to be an effort at state interposition.37 The
Southern Manifesto would appear to be exactly the reason why interposition is
undesirable. However, Michael Klarman notes, the response of southern states to Brown
does more to marshal public opinion for desegregation than Brown did on its own.38
Eventually, when northern whites faced a choice between Brown and the interposing
southern States and the Southern Manifesto, they chose Brown. This is hardly a perfect
story but it demonstrates that interposition may have merit even when employed for
illiberal purposes.
Resisting the twenty-first century Constitution may require creative solutions and
early American constitutionalism is a wellspring. Careful scrutiny of these constitutional
traditions may reveal that they contain democratic resources useful for advancing
democratic practice. The use of interposition by New England states to fight Jefferson’s
Embargo and the corresponding expansion of executive power demonstrates that it may
have utility to contemporary progressives interested in combating the unitary executive.
State-driven constitutionalism may not be as anathema to progressive constitutionalism as
often thought. Whatever the merits of interposition, we should remember that
contemporary problems are likely not wholly new and that past generations have fought
similar constitutional battles. Their innovations are useful resources for contemporary
constitutional problems.
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